试读版 | 习近平为欧美驱逐华为提供了证词
孟晚舟美国法庭有机会反证
What’s on my mind…
Sometimes one’s opinion is immediately proven right or wrong. Other times, controversies surrounding one’s view continues for a long time. My thoughts on China’s “Reform and Opening Up” policies and its “Development of the Legal System” initiatives fall into the latter category. For more than 30 years, I have maintained that if the economic reforms turn out successful, the CCP regime is likely to be strengthened: Both the ruling party and outside observers may mistakenly attribute the economic prosperity to CCP’s effective governance and may lose the enthusiasm to learn from the West, thus making the political transition to a more open and democratic regime more difficult. Over the past few years some have come to agree with my view, but many still sit there shaking their heads no.
Another controversial view I hold is that under the current political framework of China, the outcome of the “Development of the Legal System” initiatives must be a collection of unjust laws. From legislation to law enforcement, the “old cadres” who had been traumatized by the lawlessness of Mao’s Cultural Revolution era before being rehabilitated to their privileged status, were afraid to be stripped of those privileges again. As a result, they are inclined to choke off sources of potential dissent in the name of maintaining “order” and “lawfulness” of the system.
Fortunately, this view is now accepted by more people. Believe it or not, I have Xi Jinping to thank, as he made it unambiguously clear that “governing by rule of law” means guaranteeing the party’s domination over the judicial system: The legal system is to execute the party's will and to heed the party's policy guidance.
Who does the legal system protect? The exquisitely structured, humongous hierarchy of interests group. This cornerstone of CCP's ruling is so strong that it renders both internal disintegration and external resistance and dissent very difficult to succeed.
But CCP’s ruling ideology, along with its companion governance system, runs counter to the norms and values of civil society, so much so that the world is increasingly keeping an wary eye on Chinese companies, who, wittingly or not, might work as accomplice of or agent for the ruling party. As a result of this suspicion, Chinese companies might lose their edge over their international competitors.
Huawei has become the target of the United States, who looks set to deal death blows to the Chinese telecommunications giant. European countries face a Huawei conundrum: Had there been no security concern, Huawei would have been their first choice. But as international pressure mounts on Huawei amid spying allegations, European nations are walking a fine line between their economic and security interests: Shunning Huawei altogether risks jeopardizing their 5G roll-outs. But what if Huawei products are indeed packed with spyware?
I am going to go out on a limb here: despite their opaque ownership structures and potential ties to the government, not all Chinese entrepreneurs work hand in glove with Chinese security agencies by spying on other nations of interest on their behalf. Many of them have energy and talents that are not to be dismissed. There's no question that China possesses one of the most sophisticated cyber security apparatus worldwide, rivaling that of the United States. But it should be noted no hard proof of espionage by Huawei has been established from spying accusations against Huawei: Neither the House intelligence committee report nor the Department of Justice indictments offered much direct, substantial evidence.
Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi’s testimony at the Munich Security Conference that “Chinese law does not require companies to install a back door or collect intelligence” is a feeble excuse. Xi Jinping contradicted it himself when he concluded the No.1 lesson China could draw from the 40 years of success since the Reform and Opening Up policy is that the country must stick to CCP leadership, which is “the fundamental character of socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Make no mistake, “East, west, south, north, and the middle, the party leads everything.” Moreoever, Chinese law explicitly requires companies to provide Beijing’s security apparatus with access to any data that touches their networks or equipment.
Laws like this makes every Chinese company- not just Huawei- and every Chinese national susceptible to espionage charges. Fortunately, Huawei also has an opportunity to defend itself and its former CFO Meng Wanzhou, which wouldn’t be possible if it had been charged by the Chinese legal and judicial system. But this will require Meng Wanzhou to bear the brunt and stand in front the court in New York. In this chaotic period of American politics, its judicial system is still functioning. The final verdict will depend on whether Meng Wanzhou really has substantial evidence to prove her innocence. At the very least, the court hearings will reveal to us more details about the inner workings of Huawei.
内容梗概
有些观点很快有对错结论，有些观点很长时间还在争论，我对改革开放和法制建设的想法就是。 30多年来，我认为经济改革开放政策如果成功，很可能使中共体制得到强化，朝野都可能误以为是体制的成功，丧失学习西方的热情，从而使政治转型更为艰难。 我的这个观点在过去几年中不断重複，得到认同的有些，但并不太多。
我的另一观点是，在中国现有政治框架下，法制的结果一定是恶法。从立法到执法，是文革复出的老幹部出于对毛泽东“无法无天”而使他们丧失特权的恐惧，所以得用法制民，可以以法的名义打击任何挑战者。 这个观点现在认同的人多了，得感谢习近平更清晰地将“依法治国”作了定义：法就是党的意志执行化，是党的政策指引。
法律保护的是结构精致、层次分明、人数庞大的利益集团，这正是中共执政的坚强基石，使内部分化、民众反抗成功都很艰难。 但是，这种与人类主流文明背道而驰的执政思想，使中国的企业极可能丧失在国际市场原本的竞争机会。
华为成为美国正全力追杀的目标，但也使欧洲出现困惑，如果没有安全顾虑，华为几乎成为了首选，但如果不用华为，技术升级可能滞后。这显示了中国企业家的能量，不象一些人以为的那么不堪。 杨洁篪在慕尼黑安全会议上的证词，很容易被彭斯击碎。习近平的党法说是有力的支持，何況中国情报法明确要求每个企业和个人，都不得拒绝情报上的合作。 这个使每个中国企业、每个中国人都可以被怀疑为间谍的法律，又怎能让华为独善其身。
华为还有一个机会为自己辨护，这是在中国法律环境下任何被捕者没有的机会。这需要孟晚舟作出牺牲，勇敢地站在纽约法庭上。 美国政治混乱的时候，法庭还是严肃的。这取決于孟晚舟是否真正有力量为自己洗白，但至少使我们瞭解华为更多。
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